CVE-2026-108362

Privasys attested TLS accepted evidence from any unrevoked TEE platform (diversion attack)

State
Published
Severity
9.1 Critical
Published
Oct 12, 2026
Updated
Oct 13, 2026
Reserved
Oct 9, 2026

Read the record on cve.org

Description

Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.

Scores

CVSSScoreVectorSource
4.09.1 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NGitHub_M

Weaknesses

Affected Products

ProductVersions
ra-tls-clientsPrivasys
  • < 0.11.0Affected

References

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