CVE-2026-47174

Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment

State
Published
Severity
9.5 Critical
Published
Jun 11, 2026
Updated
Jun 11, 2026
Reserved
May 18, 2026

Read the record on cve.org

Description

In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.

Scores

CVSSScoreVectorSource
4.09.5 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:HGitHub_M

Weaknesses

  • CWE-829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Affected Products

ProductVersions
duck-siteduck-organization
  • < 1.0.1Affected

References

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