CVE-2026-72084

scsi: target: Bound PR-OUT TransportID parsing to the received buffer

State
Published
Severity
9.8 Critical
Published
Aug 15, 2026
Updated
Oct 19, 2026
Reserved
Aug 9, 2026

Read the record on cve.org

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: target: Bound PR-OUT TransportID parsing to the received buffer

core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() and core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move() hand the raw PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter buffer to target_parse_pr_out_transport_id() without telling it how many bytes are valid. For an iSCSI TransportID (FORMAT CODE 01b), iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() locates the ",i,0x" ISID separator with an unbounded strstr() (and on the error path prints the name with a further unbounded "%s"). An initiator can submit a TransportID whose iSCSI name contains neither a ",i,0x" substring nor a NUL terminator, filling the parameter list to its end, so the scan runs off the end of the buffer.

When the parameter list spans more than one page the buffer is a multi-page vmap (transport_kmap_data_sg()), so the over-read walks into the trailing vmalloc guard page and oopses (KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in strstr). It is reachable by any fabric that delivers a PR OUT to a device exported through an iSCSI TPG, including a guest via vhost-scsi.

Pass the number of received bytes down to the parser and validate the iSCSI TransportID's own self-described length (ADDITIONAL LENGTH + 4) once, up front: reject it if it is below the spc4r17 minimum or larger than the received buffer, then bound the separator search, the ISID walk and the name copy by that length. This is the length check the callers already perform after the parse (core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() compares tid_len against tpdl, core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move() validates it against data_length), moved ahead of the scan. Also drop the unbounded "%s" of the unterminated name.

Add per-format explicit name-length checks before copying into i_str, rather than silently truncating with min_t: for FORMAT CODE 00b reject if the descriptor body (tid_len - 4 bytes) cannot fit in i_str[TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN]; for FORMAT CODE 01b reject if the name portion (from &buf[4] up to the separator) cannot fit. Both checks make the bounds intent explicit at each format branch.

While here, also reject a FORMAT CODE 01b TransportID whose ",i,0x" separator sits at the very end of the descriptor: that leaves an empty ISID and points the returned port nexus pointer at buf + tid_len, one past the descriptor, which the registration code (__core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg(), __core_scsi3_alloc_registration()) then dereferences as the ISID string -- the same over-read of the parameter buffer for a malformed descriptor.

Scores

CVSSScoreVectorSource
3.19.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HLinux

Weaknesses

Affected Products

ProductVersions
LinuxLinux
  • c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5 to before 88c67c3de914e19172e1d878a7625c5b06c20ec5Affected
  • c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5 to before 842248047ef28dbf3b3f7f49a0ec315054d4dab8Affected
  • c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5 to before 03fbc7de8d5e85fc8420e57e8304c855efd453abAffected
  • c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5 to before 6ca5de8782e67573a61a6736b6dc0ffe58dcdf59Affected
  • c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5 to before 9298078a8f7d8181a04614a34ab655ccdf038204Affected
  • c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5 to before 004ccd2d3b4ac36a300e05e01df152e5c02a5a82Affected
  • c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5 to before 555a89846ed888d7401b3f7200934c0fbedcbb46Affected
  • c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5 to before d04a179085c262c9ed577d0a4cbc6482ff1fd9a3Affected
LinuxLinux
  • 2.6.38Affected
  • before 2.6.38Not affected
  • 5.10.266 through 5.10.*Not affected
  • 5.15.212 through 5.15.*Not affected
  • 6.1.178 through 6.1.*Not affected
  • 6.6.145 through 6.6.*Not affected
  • 6.12.97 through 6.12.*Not affected
  • 6.18.40 through 6.18.*Not affected
  • 7.1.5 through 7.1.*Not affected
  • 7.2 and laterNot affected

References

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