CVE-2026-75595

Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext

State
Published
Severity
9.1 Critical
Published
Aug 19, 2026
Updated
Aug 20, 2026
Reserved
Aug 17, 2026

Read the record on cve.org

Description

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.

Scores

CVSSScoreVectorSource
4.09.1 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NGitHub_M

Weaknesses

  • CWE-754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions

Affected Products

ProductVersions
nettynetty
  • < 4.1.137.FinalAffected
  • >= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.17.FinalAffected

References

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