CVE-2026-80827

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback

The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize:

buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd); port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);

When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly 8 bytes).

If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize), the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read:

data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)]

which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read.

Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest, and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the conditional. Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency.

[ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ]