CVE-2026-98273

x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions

State
Published
Severity
Not scored
Published
Oct 6, 2026
Updated
Oct 19, 2026
Reserved
Sep 25, 2026

Read the record on cve.org

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Scores

The record has no CVSS score.

Weaknesses

The record names no weakness.

Affected Products

ProductVersions
LinuxLinux
  • 6256e668b7af9d81472e03c6a171630c08f8858a to before cfc1af3d054aaabee08f1f77c441b3533b082869Affected
  • 6256e668b7af9d81472e03c6a171630c08f8858a to before d8c6a18c0552135cbf0c696c9019b2979d0862c9Affected
  • 6256e668b7af9d81472e03c6a171630c08f8858a to before a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255Affected
  • ba7d1dae9fe866abe74bb1e849fb85983b7c4c37Affected
  • 5.10.190 to before 5.11Affected
LinuxLinux
  • 5.13Affected
  • before 5.13Not affected
  • 6.18.54 through 6.18.*Not affected
  • 7.2.8 through 7.2.*Not affected
  • 7.3 and laterNot affected

References

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