CVE-2026-99751

bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()

State
Published
Severity
Not scored
Published
Nov 20, 2026
Updated
Nov 20, 2026
Reserved
Sep 25, 2026

Read the record on cve.org

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()

The issue: This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric. After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().

__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking only that mac_header < network_header. Nothing verifies that the MAC header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the redirect goes on to read is linear either.

A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:

bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0); bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);

after vlan pop_eth. The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb->len < skb->data_len BUG in __skb_pull():

kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839! RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50 Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -> packet_xmit -> packet_sendmsg Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC header is gone. On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0 after the pull, so the network header sits at skb->tail and the route lookup reads ip4h->protocol, ip4h->saddr and ip4h->daddr past the linear area.

The Fix: Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of skb->mac_len. mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit packets, while the span still rejects the one-byte header produced by pop_eth + bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0). The single check also covers the mac_header >= network_header test it replaces.

Use pskb_may_pull() to make the Ethernet header linear before it is read or pulled, and to make the IP header linear in both the v4 and the v6 path before ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() is read. The header pointers are taken after the pull, since pskb_may_pull() may reallocate skb->head.

Conditions to recreate the bug: On x86-64 with 4 KiB pages, enable CONFIG_PACKET, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL, CONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS, CONFIG_NET_CLS_MATCHALL, CONFIG_NET_ACT_VLAN and CONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF. Run as root with BPF loading, network administration and raw-packet privileges. Bring lo up and attach a SCHED_ACT program that calls bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0), then returns bpf_redirect_neigh(skb->ifindex, NULL, 0, 0):

ip link set lo up tc qdisc add dev lo clsact tc filter add dev lo egress matchall action vlan pop_eth pipe \ action bpf object-file neigh_chghead.o section action

Send an untagged ETH_P_IP frame of ETH_HLEN + 8192 bytes through an AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW socket bound to lo, without PACKET_VNET_HDR or PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS. Use a unicast destination MAC. The sender's skb has a 14-byte linear Ethernet prefix and a fragmented payload; pop_eth removes that prefix and change_head restores only one linear byte. The unfixed neighbor redirect then tries to pull 14 bytes and BUGs.

Sending the same frame without pop_eth and change_head leaves the IP header in the frags, which is the route lookup reading past skb->tail.

Scores

The record has no CVSS score.

Weaknesses

The record names no weakness.

Affected Products

ProductVersions
LinuxLinux
  • b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592 to before a725401dd629c6fdda47e3a02efed539ac0ed6d0Affected
  • b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592 to before 2009032471be8b9622bf2496ce9c6b06a1015905Affected
  • b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592 to before 890fd9c4e02bc9e477e6365fef4ac8c2262a3b3cAffected
  • b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592 to before 23503acb214cbefaf3945d05ab9667ff11ae3de9Affected
LinuxLinux
  • 5.10Affected
  • before 5.10Not affected
  • 6.12.118 through 6.12.*Not affected
  • 6.18.64 through 6.18.*Not affected
  • 7.3.5 through 7.3.*Not affected
  • 7.4-rc2 and laterNot affected

References

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