CVE-2026-99777
net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests
- State
- Published
- Severity
- Not scored
- Published
- Nov 20, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 20, 2026
- Reserved
- Sep 25, 2026
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests
alloc_requests() initializes usb9pfs->in_req->context to point at the struct f_usb9pfs instance itself. usb9pfs_queue_tx() later overwrites this with the real struct p9_req_t pointer before every transmit, and usb9pfs_tx_complete() clears it back to NULL after each completion, so in_req->context only ever holds a valid p9_req_t once a request has actually been queued.
usb9pfs_clear_tx(), however, can run at any time (mount close, gadget disable) independent of whether a request was ever queued. If it runs before the first usb9pfs_transmit(), it reads the leftover sentinel value, type-confuses the struct f_usb9pfs pointer as a struct p9_req_t, and both writes through it (req->t_err = -ECONNRESET) and hands it to p9_client_cb(), which manipulates req->wq and req->refcount at bogus offsets inside f_usb9pfs. This reliably corrupts memory or panics whenever the transport is torn down before any 9p request has been transmitted, e.g. mounting and immediately unmounting, or a cable disconnect racing the very first request.
usb9pfs->out_req->context is set the same way but is never read by this transport (usb9pfs_rx_complete() identifies the instance via ep->driver_data instead), so it serves no purpose either.
Both endpoints' ->driver_data are already set to usb9pfs in enable_endpoint(), which is what the completion handlers actually use to recover the f_usb9pfs instance. Just drop the leftover ->context assignments; usb_ep_alloc_request()/alloc_ep_req() already return zeroed requests, so in_req->context correctly starts out NULL.
Scores
The record has no CVSS score.
Weaknesses
The record names no weakness.
Affected Products
| Product | Versions |
|---|---|
LinuxLinux |
|
LinuxLinux |
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References
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